Blind quantum computation (BQC) protocol allows a client having partial quantum ability to delegate his quantum computation to a remote quantum server without leaking any information about the input, the output and the intended computation to the server. Several BQC protocols have been proposed, 
Introduction
Blind quantum computation (BQC) is one of the most important research topics in quantum cryptography that enables a client to delegate a quantum computation to a quantum server without revealing any information about the input, the output and the intended computation to the server. Since Childs [3] proposed the first BQC protocol in 2005, a variety of BQC protocols have been proposed [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] .
In 2009, Broadbent et al. [5] presented the first universal single-server BQC protocol, and also proposed a double-server BQC protocol modified from the single-server BQC protocol. In the double-server BQC protocol, the client can be completely classical if both servers (Bob1 and Bob2) pre-share entangled states and do not communicate with each other. Recently, Li et al. [1] claimed that the restrictions of noncommunicating servers and pre-sharing of entangled states between both servers can be removed if one more server is introduced. Hence, they proposed a triple-server BQC protocol based on the technique of entanglement swapping. In their protocol, three servers can communicate with one another and the client can be almost classical, i.e., only with the capability of receiving and sending qubits. Nevertheless, Xu et al. [2] later indicated that it is unnecessary for the client to communicate with three servers, and hence proposed a single-server BQC protocol.
However, this paper will point out a loophole in both Li et al. and Xu et al.'s protocols. With this loophole, the server is able to reveal the private information, such are the input, the output and the intended computation, which the client does not want the server to know. In this paper, we will use Xu et al.'s single-server BQC protocol as an example to describe the loophole and the attack.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews Xu et al.'s single-server BQC protocol. Step 5. Alice sends 2m classical message θ k = (−1)
to Bob, where
in Step 4. The other θ k and (z k , x k ) are selected randomly.
Step 6. Bob measures his first 2m particles in the basis ±θ k 2m k=1 and sends the measurement results
to Alice.
Step
Step 8. Since Bob has the m qubit graph state ⊗ ). And Bob cannot calculate without having and . It also means that the input, the output and the intended computation will not be revealed.
However, in this article, we will point out two ways for Bob to obtain {s i } ) Alice selected to resend. For example, when Charlie sends the first particle to Alice, if Alice resends it to Bob, Bob will get that particle at that time and he will know that Alice resends it; otherwise, if Alice discards it, Bob will not get any particle at that time and he will know that Alice discards it.
The second attack is a Trojan horse attack [9] [10] [11] . Since the quantum bits are transmitted twice in these 
Conclusions
We have shown that Xu et al.'s BQC protocol scheme is not secure against server's attack. A server can obtain client's information without being detected. The same attack can also be successful in Li et al.'s BQC. The Trojan horse attack can be easily prevented by device. However, the eavesdropping attack be an interesting future research.
